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Abstract 
 
Regions and regionalism are rather flourishing in 
Europe. But what do regionalism and the expression Ä(XURSHRI UHJLRQV´ 
exactly mean? There are three approaches to the question: 1.) the concept of 
cross-border interregionality between the Member States of the European 
Union; 2.) the effort to make regions the basic building blocks of European 
integration instead of states; and 3.) the objective to introduce a three-tier 
structure to the European Union which would extend the already existing 
tiers of the European Union and the Member States with a third one, the 
territorial units within nation-states. The first approach (interregional 
cooperation) has long been adopted; the second approach (the vision of 
Europe made up of regions instead of states) is rather utopian. The third 
one is subject to fierce debates: a three-tier European Union with European, 
nation-state and regional levels.  
Keywords: region; regionalism; supranational; integration; principle of 
subsidiarity; 
 
Although the form, motives and causes of movements promoting 
regionalism may vary greatly2, their purpose is the same for 
autonomous, federalist and separatist movements alike: to relativise the 
existing central nation-state. Thus, advancing European integration has 
become a natural ally for them as ± from their perspective ± it meant the 
disfunctionality of traditional nation-states. A supranational and 
therefore multinational and multicultural community promises much 
more room for development than a classic nation-state. 
Nevertheless, regionalism and European integration could only 
converge effectively at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, following the 
Ä(XURSHRIUHJLRQV´ concept. As European integration mainly delivered 
on the hopes relating to the concept of Europe after World War II, it has 
achieved its goal in the eye of many Europeans and new steps of 
integration have become necessary. Many are afraid of the European 
Union becoming a behemoth super-state which would devour 
democratic constitutional nation-states together with their 
achievements.3 The regionalisation of the integration process, however, 
                                                             
1 Historian, PhD, University RI3pFV, csilladomok@yahoo.de 
2 Dirk GERDES: Regionalismus als soziale Bewegung, Frankfurt/New York, 
1985; Wolfgang LIPP: Industriegesellschaft und Regionalkultur, .|OQ, 198.; Hans-
Georg WEHLING: Regionen und Regionalismus in Westeuropa, Stuttgart, 1987. 
3 Manfred BRUNNER: Kartenhaus Europa? Abkehr  vom Zentralismus-
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promises to remedy this situation. In line with the principles of 
federalism and subsidiarity, regionality should create new legitimacy 
and promote acceptance toward the European Union. 
But what do regionalism and the expression Ä(XURSH RI UHJLRQV´ 
exactly mean? There are three approaches to the question4: first, the 
concept of cross-border interregionality between the Member States of 
the European Union; second, the effort to make regions the basic 
building blocks of European integration instead of states; and finally, the 
objective to introduce a three-tier structure to the European Union 
which would extend the already existing tiers of the European Union and 
the Member States with a third one, the territorial units within nation-
states. The first approach (interregional cooperation) is conventional 
and has long been adopted; the second approach (the vision of Europe 
made up of regions instead of states) is rather utopian. The third one is 
subject to fierce debates: a three-tier European Union with European, 
nation-state and regional levels. 
First, we have to clarify the meaning of regions and territorial units in a 
European context, which represent the third tier. The Community Charter 
for Regionalisation, adopted by the European Parliament in 1988, defines 
µUHJLRQ¶DVIROORZVÄFor the purposes of this Charter the word region shall 
be taken to mean a territory which constitutes, from a geographical point 
of view, a clear-cut entity or a similar grouping of territories where there 
is continuity and whose population possesses certain shared features and 
wishes to safeguard the resulting specific identity and to develop it with 
the object RI VWLPXODWLQJ FXOWXUDO VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLFSURJUHVV µ6KDUHV
IHDWXUHV¶VKDOOEHWDNHQWRPHDQODQJXDJHFXOWXUHKLVWRULFDOWUDGLWLRQDQG
interests related to the economy and transport. It is not necessary that all 
of these elements be present in every cDVH´5 
A geographically Äclear-FXW HQWLW\´, a Äsimilar grouping of 
WHUULWRULHV´, a population with ÄFHUWDLQ VKDUHG IHDWXUHV´ in terms of 
language, culture and historical traditions ± it is obvious that such 
vaguely described areas cannot provide a solid foundation for 
determining the third tier of the European Union. Such a European 
Union probably exists only in regional studies and at the level of hopes 
and intentions, but definitely not in terms of powers of action or from a 
legal perspective. 
                                                                                                                                              
Neuanfang durch Vielfalt, 0QFKHQ. 
4 Rudolf HRBEK: 'LH GHXWVFKHQ /lQGHU YRU GHQ+HUDXVIRUGHUXQJHQ GHU (*-
Integration, IN: Bernhard VOGEL*QWKHU+OETTINGER: )|GHUDOLsmus in der 
%HZlKUXQJ .|OQ±33. 19f. 
5 European Parliament Resolution on Community regional policy and the role of 
the regions; Gemeinschaftscharta der Regionalisierung, In print: Joachim BAUER : 
Europa der Regionen. Aktuelle Dokumente zur Rolle und Zukunft der deutschen 
/lQGHULPHXURSlLVFKHQ,QWHJUDWLRQVSUR]H Berlin, 1991. 23±20. 33. 
 
 
g7.217,1(16D]ÒM- pV-HOHQNRUL(J\HWHPHV7|UWpQHWL7DQV]pNWXGRPiQ\RVN|]OHPpQ\HL1o 2015/2. 
ELTE, BTK, BUDAPEST, 2018. 
 
33 
The ÄregionV´ defined by the European Commission as target areas 
for its regional policy are also of little use here.6 These are nothing more 
than statistical quantities which disregard the competence of individual 
territorial units in legislation, public administration and legal practice, 
their institutional structure and their role in the decision making process 
of the unitary state. If we nevertheless have a look at the shared 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHUHJLRQV¶SRZHUVRIDFWLRQZHILQGWKDWÄregion as a 
statistical lDEHO´ refers to quite different realities in Europe. 
This means that the foundations of regions, which can be considered 
for defining the third European tier, is highly heterogeneous. The 
spectrum ranges from the dependent administrative units of unitary 
Member States (such as in Ireland) to the federated states of Germany 
which have constitutional and budgetary autonomy and have powers to 
express opinion at federal level. Consequently, there is disparity not only 
in the potential political interest in using the third tier of European 
structures but also in the resources required by Member States to carry 
out this process. 
 
Antecedents of European integration 
 
The advance of German states were primarily due to the changes in 
importance resulting from the federal system of Germany. Integration 
necessarily entails the waiver of German sovereign rights for the 
European Community. Based on its integration competence of Germany 
(Article 24(1) of the Basic Law), the federation may transfer certain 
rights to European organisations, including its own rights and that of the 
states, without the approval of the Federal Council. This way, several 
state-level legislative competences have been transferred to European 
level since the establishment of the European Community.7 
In addition to the transfer of sovereign rights expressly listed in the 
treaties, the competences of the German states have been 
ÄFODQGHVWLQHO\´ undermined. Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, which gives 
the Council the power to act if any action by the Community is necessary 
to achieve a Community aim in cases where the Treaty has not provided 
for the requisite powers of action, made it possible to create a Äself-
VHUYLFH V\VWHPRI FRPSHWHQFHV´ for the European Community. Besides 
                                                             
6 )RUWKH(8¶VIXQGLQJGHOLYHU\PHFKDQLVPVWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQXVHVWKH
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) which defines three levels: 
NUT6,1876,,1876,,,UHJLRQV&I.RPPLVVLRQGHU(XURSlLVFKHQ
*HPHLQVFKDIW'LH 5HJLRQHQ LQ GHQ HU -DKUHQ  SHULRGLVFKHU %HULFKW EHU GLH
sozio-|NRQRPLVFKH/DJHXQG(QWZLFNOXQJGHU5HJLRQHQGHU*HPHLQVFKDIW. 
7 Thomas REMMERS: EuroSlLVFKH*HPHLQVFKDIWHQXQG.RPSHWHQ]YHUOXVWHGHU
GHXWVFKHQ /lQGHU Frankfurt am Main, 1992. Tobias BUSCH: %XQGHVOlQGHU LP
*UXQGJHVHW]LP6SDQQXQJVIHOGGHUHXURSlLVFKHQ,QWHJUDWLRQ Plaffenweiler, 1990.  
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the area of economy, the extension of competences reached all the areas 
of domestic policy which had been considered the ÄKROLHVW´ parts of the 
states: self-government, public and higher education, police and media. 
This made it clear for the states that their political essence is at stake. 
The transfer of the legislative competence of the federation to the 
Community shifted the centre of gravity to the detriment of the federated 
states. The states were deprived of their right to intervene in federal 
legislation in the form of protest and veto. Ä3DUWLFLSDWRU\IHGHUDOLVP´, on 
which the federated states could rely in the past decades by replacing parts 
of their original legislative rights to matters delegated to the federation in 
turn of the veto right of the Federal Council, became futile in this sense. 
Furthermore, the Community also intervened into a central element 
of state powers: public administration. The thoroughness with which the 
Council and the Commission adopt provisions and determine directions, 
has become legendary in the meanWLPH7KH\UHVWULFWWKHVWDWHV¶URRPIRU
manoeuvre in applying the federal law provided by the German federal 
constitution. Examples of the perfectionistic regulation of details are 
part of the ÄEuro-IRONORUH´ ranging from the guidelines for preparing a 
change of government to the regulation of agricultural vehicles and the 
labelling of tobacco products. 
Instrumental in this process was the fact that European integration 
KDG EHHQ VWULFNHQ E\ D NLQG RI ³SURYLQFLDO LQVHQVLWLYLW\´ IURP WKH
beginning. The legal order of the Community is based on international 
legal treaties which confer it on the states as contracting parties to 
regulate the transfer of sovereign rights within the state. Accordingly, 
until the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht, Community law only 
recognised Member States at European level, but not provinces or 
regions. From the perspective of the Treaty, regions were considered as 
ÄQRPDQ¶VODQG´. So only the representatives of the states had the right to 
participate in exercising the transfHUUHG SRZHUV LQ WKH &RPPXQLW\¶V
organisations, while regions could not even enjoy a partial compensation 
for the powers taken from them. 
Initially, state governments received intervention rights through the 
Federal Council instead of state parliaments, so it was not the Federal 
Parliament but the Federal Government which exercises euro-political 
powers. This led to a legitimacy deficit of political decisions affecting 
Europe which could not even be compensated by the European Parliament. 
In view of imbalances within the federation, the problem of federated 
states is not surprising; they can fall victim of European integration 
which may finally result in their degradation to a kind of Äunion of 
KLJKHUDGPLQLVWUDWLYHXQLWV´ within the ÄDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSURYLQFH´ of the 
federation.8 It is also unsurprising that the federated states adopted a 
                                                             
8 Hans-Heinrich RUPP: Maastricht - eine neue Verfassung? =HLWVFKULIW IU
Rechtspolitik, 1993. 211±213. 213. 
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dual defensive strategy. On the one hand, they aimed to strictly control 
of any further transfer of sovereign rights, on the other hand, following 
the logic of participatory federalism, they aimed to intervene in the 
exercise of the powers that were already lost. This dual defensive 
strategy, by nature, manifested in two different levels at the same time: 
within the federation and within Europe.9 
The control of transfer of sovereign powers within the federation 
means closing the door through which the transfer occurs (i.e. the 
application of Article 24(1) of the Basic Law). This is achieved either by 
withdrawing the exclusive state-OHYHO FRPSHWHQFHV RI WKH IHGHUDWLRQ¶V
integration power, or by making all or certain competences conditional 
on the approval of the Federal Council. Within the federation 
intervention right means that the federated states have a decisive role 
within the federation in expressing opinions on European matters in the 
preparation of the decisions of the competent European organisations. 
At European level, the defensive strategy of the federated states mean 
the effort to eliminate the ÄSURYLQFLDO LQVHQVLWLYLW\´ and direct the 
attention to the subnational level of federated states and regions: on the 
one hand, by enshrining the principle of subsidiarity in Community law, 
and, on the other hand, by connecting federated states and other 
supranational entities directly to the process of the expression of 
political intent of Europe through delegating representatives to the 
Council and an extraordinary regional chamber. This is precisely the 
Ä(XURSHRIUHJLRQV´ programme. 
This defensive strategy of German federated states dates back to the 
1980s and initially it could only produce partial results. The real 
breakthrough was achieved with the Treaty of Maastricht and the 
resulting changes in the Basic Law. 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht and the new Europe article of the 
Basic Law 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht and the new Europe article of the Basic Law 
strongly correlated both historically and substantially. They put the 
euro-political role of the federated states to new legal foundations. What 
was the benefit of the Treaty of Maastricht and the new Europe article?10 
The Treaty of Maastricht can be measured against the specific 
negotiating goals defined by the federated states in advance. The prime 
PLQLVWHUV¶FRQIHUHQFHLQ-XQHGHFLGHGRQIRXUIXQGDPHQWDOFODLPV11: 
                                                             
9 Jochen HUHN/Peter-Christian WITT: )|GHUDOLVPXV LQ 'HXWVFKODQG Baden-
Baden, 1992. 217±238.  
10  Franz H. U. BORKENHAGEN: 9RPNRRSHUDWLYHQ)|GHUDOLVPXV]XPÄEuropa 
GHU5HJLRQHQ´, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1992. B 42. 36±44. 
11 Joachim BAUER: 5pJLyN(XUySiMD(XURSHRI5HJLRQV Berlin, 1991. 41±97. 
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the inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the treaties of the 
Community; the creation of a regional council; the opening of the 
ministerial council for the representatives of the federated states and 
regions; and the right of complaint of federated states and regions. 
The first three claims were included in the EU Treaty, though the 
exact wordings differed from the relevant proposals and concepts of the 
federated states. The right of complaint of federated states, however, was 
not included in the Treaty. The Federal Government did not accept this 
claim due to constitutional considerations, so this item was not put on 
the agenda of negotiations at all. 
(a) The principle of subsidiarity was first defined as a general 
principle of community law. The goals of the EU, and therefore the 
general goals of the Treaty, had to be achieved in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity. This is based on the definition in Article 3b which 
stipulates as follows: 
Ä1. The Community shall act within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it 
therein. 
2. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community. 
3. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is 
QHFHVVDU\WRDFKLHYHWKHREMHFWLYHVRIWKLV7UHDW\´ 
Comparing paragraphs 1 and 3 of the subsidiarity Article, their 
significance is beyond dispute. Paragraph 1 shall be understood as the 
restriction of competences; the activity of the Community is made 
conditional on the principle of restricted individual authorisation. 
Paragraph 3 bounds the Community to the principle of relativity. 
Paragraph 2, however, sparks fierce debates12. It says that the 
Community may only take action if and in so far as the objectives cannot 
be ÄVXIILFLHQWO\ DFKLHYHG´ by the Member States and if they can be 
ÄEHWWHU DFKLHYHG´ by the Community. This wording is a compromise 
which combines two concepts. While the wording Äcannot be sufficiently 
DFKLHYHG´ sets a clear limit for community competences, the Äbetter 
DFKLHYHG´ provides more ground to use those competences. The 
federated states thus miss the Äclear rejection of European centralist 
SURFHVVHV´13 from this compromise wording. 
                                                             
12 Torsten STEIN: 6XEVLGLDULWlW DOV 5HFKWVSULQ]LS" Detlef MERTEN: Die 
6XEVLGLDULWlW(XURSDV 2nd ed. Berlin, 1994. 23±40. Detlef MERTEN: 6XEVLGLDULWlW
als Verfassungsprinzip, in: ibid. 77±96.  
13 Rudolf HRBEK: 'HU (UWUDJ GHU ³9HUIDVVXQJVGHEDWWH´ YRQ 0DDVWULFKW (LQ
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(b) The composition of the Council of Ministers in the Treaty (EC 
Treaty, Article 146(1)) was extended with the participation of ministers at 
federative state and regional level. So far, all Council members had to 
belong to the central governments of the Member States. From now on, 
only the ÄPLQLVWHULDO´ status is relevant, irrespective of whether the 
representative is from the central, federated state or regional government. 
This makes it possible to enforce regional interests more strongly and 
effectively in the Community. These claims, by the way, were pushed 
through by the Belgian delegation rather than the German one. The 
application of this provision is left to regulation within the Member State. 
(c) The EC Treaty (Article 198a) also foresees the establishment of a 
Ä&RPPLWWHHRIWKH5HJLRQV´. This committee only has a consultative role 
and comprises the 189 members of regional and local bodies, including 
24 German members. According to the Treaty, the committee has to 
consult in a number of matters, including supporting objectives in 
general education, cultural life, health, and certain aspects of networks 
outside Europe and of regional policy. The Committee of the Regions 
may also express its position in any European issue. 
A similarly important provision is enshrined in Article 23 which 
reinforces the positions of federated states under community law vis-
j-vis their positions within the Member State. In connection with the 
implementing laws and a governmental agreement between the 
federation and the federated states it regulates three relevant areas: 
the transfer of sovereign rights to the European Union, the 
participation of federated states in decision-making affecting 
European policy within the Member State, and external 
representation vis-j-vis the European Union14. 
Criticism voiced against the new Europe article, concerning the 
excessive increase of powers of federated states, primarily presented 
three arguments: 
(1) The Europe article is an ÄLOOHJLWLPDWH´ child of the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Many ventured so far as to talk about Äblackmailing 
FRQVWHOODWLRQV´ and ÄVKRSSLQJIUHQ]\´ where federated states reached for 
everything in their sight15. This criticism is opposed by the fact that 
powers to participate in constitutionally planned decisions are meant to 
be used. Junctions (so-FDOOHG µMXQNWLPV¶ DQG SODQQHG SDFNDJHV DOVR
form part of normal everyday political transactions. 
                                                                                                                                              
(UIROJ IU GHQ )|GHUDOLVPXV XQG GLH GHXWVFKHQ /lQGHU, IN -UJHQ ) BAUR: 
Europarecht ± (QHUJLHUHFKW:LUWVFKDIWVUHFKW)HVWVFKULIWIU%RGR%|Uner), .|OQ
1992. 125±149. 138. 
14 Ruppert SCHOLZ: *UXQGJHVH]W XQG HXURSlLVFKH(LQLJXQJ Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 45, 1992. 2593±2601. 
15 Wolfgang PHILIPP:Ein dreistufiger Bundesstaat=HLWVFKULIWIU5HFKWVSROLWLN
1972. 433±438. 436.  
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(2) Setting the condition that the transfer of sovereign rights should 
be approved by the constitutional majority of the Federal Council acts 
again integration and makes Germany ÄXQVXLWDEOHWRZDUG(XURSH´. As 
opposed to this argument, the federated states have so far fully 
supported the European integration process and ultimately transferred 
new competences to the Community under the Treaty of Maastricht. On 
the other hand, if it is true that the transfer of further sovereign rights 
triggers the amendment of the constitution, it is consistent to use in this 
field as well the procedures generally planned for the amendment of the 
constitution. 
(3) The participation of the federated states in the process of 
H[SUHVVLQJWKHSROLWLFDOLQWHQWRI(XURSHZHDNHQV*HUPDQ\¶VSRZHUVof 
action in integration policy. This approach is based on the assumption 
that tying the German negotiation positions to the coercive mandate 
provided by the Federal Council ruins the chances of successful 
negotiations. 
 
 
The principle of subsidiarity in practice 
 
Ironically, the principle of subsidiarity, which was first introduced to 
community law on the initiative of the federated states, can be indirectly 
advantageous to the federated states as in the form given to it in the 
Treaty it can only exert its impact in the Member States of the 
Community rather than in transnational entities. As a prerequisite for 
such an indirect effect, the principle of subsidiarity should create a clear 
allocation of competences between the Community and the Member 
States ± which is quite dubious. 
As opposed to national constitutions, the EC Treaty does not require 
the definition and allocation of competences, but normally obligates the 
organisations of the Community to make certain integration policy 
objectives which must be archived by appropriate Ämeasures´ 7KH
principle of functional allocation of tasks usually overarching sectors is 
not violated by requiring the principle of subsidiarity to be met. The 
formula that the Community may only take action if the objectives 
enshrined in the Treaty cannot be ÄVXIILFLHQWO\´ achieved by the Member 
States and can be ÄEHWWHU´DFKLHYHGE\WKH&RPPXQLW\GRHVQRWSURYLGH
a clear set of criteria for refusing the regulatory claims of the 
Community. ÄIt leaves the decision on the issue of competences to the 
subjective consideration of organisations and decision-makers, to 
which the natural interest of the systematic and restrictive application 
of the principle cannot be subordinated ab ovo´16 
                                                             
16 Werner WEIDENFELD: (XURSD ¶ 5HIRUPSURJUDPP IU GLH (XURSlLVFKH
Union, *WHUVORK 
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Summary 
 
ÄA state is both too big and too smalO´17 Today there is an increasing 
need to strengthen the supranational political level, i.e. to create regions. 
The situation of nation-states is not an easy one: they must be constantly 
on the alert because of the effects of the globalisation and the alienation 
of the constituent parts of the state. One of the answers given to this 
challenge was the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union of the 
EU, which reacted to the economic pressure of the global market, and 
the inclusion of the above-mentioned principle of subsidiarity in the 
Treaty of Maastricht. The reasons why regionalism has gained strength 
can be summarised as follows: economic reasons, easier way of 
addressing certain economic challenges, and the emergence of the so-
called Äcooperative-communLFDWLYH VWDWH LGHDO´. Another reason is the 
reduction of euro-bureaucracy, the shortening of the decision-making 
chain, which can counterbalance economic and political integration. The 
emergence of ÄHXURUHJLRQDOLVP´, that is, cooperation along the 
borderlines, and the traditional forms of belonging together and the 
sense of identity are also important factors. It is evident for all 
stakeholders that in order to exploit the full potential of regionalism all 
its components (such as economic cohesion, geographical 
characteristics, cultural identity and territorial mobility) have to be 
present at the same time in the given area. If any of the components is 
missing, the region as a territorial unit itself becomes questionable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
17 Peter WAGSTAFF: Regions, Nations, Identities. IN: Regionalism in the 
European Union, Portland, 1999. 116. 
